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Abstract
Using supermarket scanner data, we test a variety of hypotheses from trade journals about
the invasion of private-label food products. According to conventional industry wisdom, name-
brand firms defended their brands against new private-label products by lowering their prices,
engaging in additional promotional activities, and increasingly differentiating their products.
Our empirical evidence is inconsistent with these beliefs.
Keywords: private label, entry, price, promotional activity, differentiation, supermarket.
When the share of private-label processed foods and beverages increases, brand-name firms’
prices tend to rise and their promotional activities fall contrary to widely held beliefs about this
industry. We use recent grocery scanner data to examine the effects of private-label entry on prices,
promotional activities, and product diversification in thirty-two food and beverage industries.
Although the food industry trade journals and newspapers have extensively discussed the “in-
vasion” of private-label products over the last decade, academics have largely ignored the effects of
this entry on prices, advertising, and product diversification. A few researchers have discussed why
firms produce private labels (Bontems, Dilhan, and Requillart; Galizzi, Venturini, and Boccaletti),
why retailers sell them (Mills, 1995; Dhar and Hoch; Narasimhan and Wilcox), and why prices
differ between private-label and branded goods (Conner and Peterson, Hinloopen and Martin).
The only academic papers that have explicitly examined the magnitude and speed of private-
label penetration or the response of brand-name firms to such entry tend to support the conventional
business wisdom. Rao and Mills (1999) derive optimal theoretical responses to the entry of private-
label goods in stylized models, and conclude that name-brand firms should increase promotion and
product diversification. The only previous empirical studies, Putsis and Cotterill and Putsis, that
focus on brand proliferation and demand and market structure responses respectively, conclude
that private-label penetration lowered the 1991–92 average price of national brands. Although this
finding may have been accurate in the early 1990s when the “invasion” started, we find the opposite
using more recent data.
In the first section we summarize the food industry’s conventional wisdom about private-label
products in a series of stylized facts. Although these stylized facts about the effects of entry are
consistent with standard economic intuition, we describe in the section Economic Theory about
Entry and Prices, four economic theories explaining why prices in noncompetitive markets may
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rise despite entry of new firms and products. In the section Data, we describe our grocery scanner
data set covering thirty-two food and beverage industries. We discuss our empirical results and
econometric methodology in the sections Evidence on the Private-Label Invasion and Evidence on
Name-brand Responses respectively. In Summary and Conclusions, we summarize our findings and
draw conclusions.
Stylized Facts
By searching Lexis-Nexis files of newspaper articles and trade journals, we identified the received
wisdom from the food and beverage industries. We summarize these common beliefs as stylized
“facts”. Although we report these claims here as though they were facts, we will show that many
of them are not true today (even if they were true at the time the statements were made).
Private-Label Invasion
Discount brands were introduced into American supermarkets in the late 1970s (Janofsky). As one
article stated, consumers long regarded such a product as “a cheap and nasty generic substitute
for the real thing, rolled out by retailers during recessions and discarded once the economy picked
up again” (The Economist). However, as that article notes, consumers changed their view when
high-quality private-label products were introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
The substantial quality improvement of private labels resulted from technological advances and
production by name-brand firms. Technological advances allowed competitors to “come close”
to replicating successful national brands (Kennedy). Additionally, some national brands started
producing private-label versions of their name-brand products, often to employ the excess capacity
in their plants. Examples include Campbell Soup (Vlasic pickles), Union Carbide (garbage bags),
Hershey Foods (Ronzoni pasta), and Del Monte (canned fruits and vegetables) (Janofsky, Beckett).
Other name-brand firms produced private-label brands in different categories from their own. For
example, H. J. Heinz Company, the leading producer of ketchup, makes about 80% of the private-
label soups sold in supermarkets (Beckett).
Consumers were becoming increasingly aware of private-label improvements as well. A Gallup
Poll commissioned by the Private Label Manufacturers Association (PLMA) reported that con-
sumers’ store brand awareness rose from 86% in 1991 to 91% in 1995, and the percentage of con-
sumers who regularly bought private-label brands increased from 77% to 83% (Responsive Database
Services Inc.). Of consumers surveyed, 76% agreed that store brands were “brands just like national
brands.” Of consumers who had bought premium private label items, 90% rated the products equal
to or better than national brands and planned to buy private-label products in the future (Doug,
Palmer).
Supermarkets started prominently displaying house brands while dropping second-tier national
brands in many categories (Janofsky). According to some reports, brands ranked third, fourth, or
fifth were particularly hard hit.
Supermarket chains learned that private labels provided higher profits than national brands.
According to Jonathan Ziegler, a retail-industry analyst at Sutro & Co., the gross margins on store
brands may be 35% or more, versus an average of 25% on other products (Beckett). Supermarket
profits also rise from carrying private-label brands because they create loyalty to a particular su-
permarket chain rather than to a national brand: Customers return to Safeway if they prefer the
chain’s Select brands.
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Response of Name-Brand Firms to Private-Label Entry
Trade journals and newspaper articles reported many round-table discussions by industry executives
in which they bemoaned the invasion of private-label products and discussed how they responded.
In addition to lowering prices and engaging in promotional activities, these executives said that they
engaged in brand building (Nijssen and Van Trijp) by increasingly differentiating their products.
For example, when consumers started switching from Kellogg’s to private-label cereals similar to
popular Kellogg’s brands (that sell at roughly half the price), Kellogg announced that it was issuing
more coupons to make its prices more competitive with generic brands, improving its advertising,
and further diversifying its products (MacDonald, 1998).
Price responses.
Many national brand executives reported that the private-label invasion was killing brand loyalty,
so that they had to cut prices to compete. This reasoning was given by Philip Morris when it cut its
price for Marlboro cigarettes, Procter & Gamble when it reduced the price of Pampers diapers by a
quarter, and Kraft General Foods when it lowered its cheese prices by 8% (Beckett, de Jonquieres
and Tait). Many other firms reported that they lowered their prices indirectly by means of sales
and discount coupons.
Promotional activities.
Name-brand manufacturers reported increasing point-of-purchase promotional activities in response
to the new competition.1 The share of promotional budgets allocated to point-of-purchase expen-
ditures and advertising were 73% and 27% in 1992, compared to 62% and 38% respectively in 1960
(Lenius). From 1980 to 1992, U.S. food manufacturers’ spending on promotional schemes, such
as money-off offers and coupons, rose from half to threequarters of total marketing budgets, while
advertising’s share fell from 44% to 25% (de Jonquieres and Tait).
Differentiation.
The executives contend that their brands are maintained through differentiation. According to
Quaker Oats’ CEO Robert S. Morrison, “Leading brands possess great long-term value only if
they can evolve over time to respond to the tastes and needs of new generations” (Martin and
Kubomura). Dale F. Morrison, president and CEO of Campbell Soup, said “We are making our
brands more contemporary, more relevant and more convenient to consumers of all ages” (Martin
and Kubomura). For instance, Campbell produced new soup varieties and packaging formats such
as its ready-to-serve tomato soup in resealable plastic containers and Campbell’s Soup To Go in
microwaveable single-serve bowls.
One might think of constantly providing new products as a flagpole strategy: “Let’s run it up
the flagpole and see who salutes it.” Products that are not accepted by consumers are quickly
dropped.
In recent years, an average of 27% of General Mills’ volume has come from products five years
old or less (Martin and Kubomura). “Our fiscal 2000 plans call for higher levels of new product
innovation across our U.S. businesses,” reports Stephen Sanger, chairman and CEO of General
1For example, Nelson and Hilke found that featuring by retailers can provide strategic advantages to a dominant
coffee manufacturer in fending off a new entrant or smaller competitor that tries to expand.
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Mills. To accelerate the flow of innovative and creative products, General Mills’ operating divisions
now focus at least 25% of total resources on new products and new business ideas. The company
has recently introduced Sunrise certified organic cereal and Yoplait Go-Gurt, a portable yogurt
snack in a flexible squeeze tube that is ready to eat refrigerated or frozen.
Many managers reported that they increased the rate at which they innovate in response to
the challenge of private labels.2 For example, firms introduced 16,143 products in 1991, including
12,398 food products and 3,745 nonfood products such as diapers and shampoo, which was 22%
more than they introduced the previous year (Kennedy).
In summary, according to conventional wisdom, private-label products have been persistently
and rapidly penetrating grocery markets since the late 1980s. This invasion has been at the expense
of national brands, and secondtier national brands were particularly hard hit. Company executives
and industry experts contend that name-brand firms responded to private-label entry in three
ways: Firms lowered prices, engaged in more promotional activities, and further differentiated their
products.
Economic Theories about Entry and Prices
All of these stylized facts appear to be reasonable. Indeed, economists usually assume that entry
leads to more competition with lower prices and possibly more promotional activities and greater
differentiation.3 However, we will present evidence that many of the stylized facts are not currently
true in processed food and beverage industries. In particular, private-label entry is correlated with
increased name-brand prices and reduced promotional activities. We start our analysis by briefly
noting that at least four economic theories allow for price increases in response to entry.
The simplest of these theoretical explanations involves quality. Manufacturers of name-brand
products may raise the quality of their goods when faced with private-label entry. This response
leads to higher name-brand product prices especially if it is more costly to produce higher quality
goods.4
Salop’s (1977) noisy monopoly theory provides a second explanation. By intentionally increasing
consumer uncertainty, a firm may be better able to exploit ignorant consumers and earn a higher
profit. One way that firms confuse customers is to create “noise” by selling virtually the same
product under various brand names. Brand proliferation pays if the cost of producing multiple
brands is relatively low and the share of consumers who are willing to buy the higher price product
is relatively large. Although this theory is widely believed to be an important explanation for
pricing behavior in the pharmaceutical industry, apparently it is less relevant in the food industry
where relatively few firms produce both branded and private-label goods in the same sector.
2The number of new supermarket and drugstore items went from a mere 1,281 in 1964 to 20,076 in 1994, though
many of these innovations presumably would have occurred in the absence of private-label competition. “Quantum
Leap.” Investor’s Business Daily, Executive Update CEO Briefing, January 20 1995, p. A3.
3The standard analyses can be found in any good introductory or intermediate undergraduate microeconomics
textbook (e.g., Lipsey, Courant, and Ragan, pp. 219, 254–260). In a common textbook example, entry into a
competitive market shifts the market supply curve to the right, lowering the equilibrium price. Similarly, when
entry occurs, noncompetitive firms may increase their as advertising and product differentiation to appeal to rivals’
consumers.
4Several industry executives report that they fight back by raising quality. General Mills Inc. Vice President
John Hallberg, said that, because his company feared technological advances that have allowed competitors to “come
close” to replicating successful brands, it focuses on product improvement: “In Big G (General Mills’ cereal division),
we have an objective to improve a third of our products every year.” (Kennedy).
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We believe that a third theory, product differentiation, provides a more compelling explanation
for price increases. For example, Perloff and Salop, Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, and Dierker
and Dierker use a random-utility-representative consumer model to show that equilibrium prices
may rise or fall as the number of products or product differentiation increases.
Similarly, entry may cause the price to rise in a single-dimension spatial model, such as Hotelling’s
linear model or Salop’s (1979) circle model. A price-setting firm that does not face a rival keeps
its price down to attract customers who are located relatively far from its product in characteristic
space. If another good locates near enough to the existing product so that both firms compete for
the same customers, the original firm may raise its price to customers located near its product in
characteristic space. The original firm no longer has an incentive to try to attract distant customers
who prefer the new product. Perloff, Seguin, and Suslow show whether the price of the existing
item rises or falls depends on how close the two products are located.
Thus, a variety of theories can explain why entry leads to higher prices. Under all these theories
except the one on quality, consumers who continue to buy branded goods are harmed by this entry
due to the higher prices. We next examine empirically whether increased private-label share leads
to higher brand-name prices and increased promotion. We also briefly consider whether it is likely
that brand-name firms increased differentiation (possibly quality) in response to private labels.
Data
We conduct our tests using Information Resources Incorporated’s (IRI) InfoScanTM data. IRI
obtains information on all items scanned at cash registers from 11,300 local grocery stores from
across the United States. The data are then scaled up to reflect all the sales in stores with revenues
of $2 million and greater.
The InfoScan data base contains information on dollar sales and physical volumes of food prod-
ucts at the brand and universal product code (UPC) or item level. The data base also contains the
share of dollar sales and physical volume sold on promotion (price reduction, special display, retail
ads, and any other type of promotion excluding coupons).
For all major chains, IRI gets a census: complete information from all of the chain’s stores. IRI
obtains between 90% and 92% of its scanner information from this census information. As these
data are already complete, no scale adjustment is required to convert this information to national
levels.
Random stratified sampling is used for the remaining (primarily nonchain) stores that agree to
participate in the survey. A rotating panel design (similar to Census Bureau surveys) is used where
a fraction of the stores is dropped from the panel each month and replaced by others.5 Information
about the entry and exit of stores is obtained from the census, from random stratified sampling
information, and from field personnel. The random stratified sampling data are then projected to
national levels.
The individual item data that we use were drawn from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s
5A rotation procedure is used to deal with dynamics in the market such as the opening and closing of individual
stores, the entry or exit of individual chains, and chains acquiring other chains. IRI makes four adjustments. When
a chain is expanding into new geographic areas and building new stores, IRI selects the new stores at the same rate
as the existing ones, and adds to the sample. If a chain is acquired by other chains, and some stores close down, each
remaining store is transferred to its new chain and each chain’s sample is adjusted as necessary. If a chain closes
stores, those stores are dropped and additional stores are added as needed. If a chain is relatively stable but makes
small changes each year, a certain proportion of the sample is changed each year.
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Economic Research Service’s version of the InfoScan data base, which contains 519 different product
types, which are in turn subsets 5 of 166 product categories from 5 major supermarket departments
(edible groceries, frozen food, bakery, dairy, and deli).
We were provided with data from thirty-four randomly selected categories—a little over one-fifth
of the available categories. We include only thirty-two of these categories in our analyses because
one category, baby food, had no private-label or generic purchases during the relevant period, and
another, wine, had only a trivial amount (0.3% of sales).
Although the data set contains information on each individual branded item sold, it reports
only aggregated data for generic and private-label items per time period. Thus, we do not know
how many private-label items or firms there were, but we do know the average price and the total
quantity sold.
Local promotion information is collected by IRI field auditors on a weekly basis and is used
to develop physical and sales volume measures of food products sold under promotion and mer-
chandising. The auditors track and classify the use of displays, retail ads, and any other retailer
merchandising efforts. Promotion information is assembled each week and merged with weekly
scanner data. The information allows IRI to differentiate regular everyday sales from sales made
under promotion or special merchandising. The Economic Research Service data base provides ten
promotion measures (five for dollar sales and five for physical volume), which reflect the share of
sales and physical volume sold under price reduction, display, feature, feature and display, and any
individual or combined use of these promotions. Price reduction refers to items with temporary
sale prices; display, to aisle or end displays; feature, to items that are primarily advertised in local
papers or paper inserts; feature and display, to items that are both advertised and on display.
We measure price for a brand as the total revenue divided by the total quantity (measured in
units of weight or volume).6 We derive our nominal prices from sales data that are net of discounts
such as from coupons. The nominal prices are converted into real prices using the Consumer Price
Index (where the index equals one in the first period). The data set covers a little over two years.
The sample is divided into twenty-nine time periods of four weeks each, which we call months.
Thus, there are thirteen IRI months per year. The first month in the sample ended on 8 December
1996, and the last one on 31 January 1999.
Evidence on the Private-Label Invasion
Have private-label products substantially penetrated food and beverage sectors and do they continue
to enter rapidly? We find that the quantity and revenue shares of private-label products and the
rates of increase of these shares are high in many (but not all) food and beverage industries.
Averaging over all thirty-two of our remaining categories (and weighting each category equally),
the revenue share of private-label and generic items is 14.3% and the quantity share is 19.0%.
Private-label and generic goods are nearly two-thirds of the quantity share of frozen poultry, but
only 1% of pickles and relish. Generics’ share was 0.6% of hot cereal sales, 0.5% of shortening and
oil, and 0.3% or less for all other categories. Moreover, no generics were sold in roughly half of
the categories. Henceforth, we treat both private label and generics as one group, which we call
private-label goods.
To determine whether the rate at which the quantity share of private-label goods increased over
6We experimented with a variety of other measures of price (e.g., average price per item, rather than by weight),
but found that our qualitative results are unaffected by the weighting used.
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our time period, we regressed the logarithm of their share on a time trend and monthly seasonal
dummies. In about half of our categories, there was no substantial change in the revenue share of
private-label goods. In only two, English muffins and ice cream, did we find a statistically significant
(at the 0.05 level) decreasing rate. Private-label goods penetration increased at a statistically
significant rate in the remaining 40% of the categories. Double-digit growth rates occurred in
slightly more than one-quarter of the categories, which are categories with typically small private-
label shares.
Evidence on Name-Brand Responses
Are stylized “facts” about the reaction of name-brand firms to increased private-label competition
correct? In particular, did name-brand firms defend their brands against the private-label invasion
by lowering their prices, conducting sales, engaging in other promotional activities, and increasingly
differentiating their products?
Prices
How do prices respond to private-label entry? Each of the four theories that we discussed above
explains why brand-name prices may rise or fall after entry of private-label products. We lack the
data to distinguish between these theories, so we take a reduced-form approach that is consistent
with all the theories. We start by examining the correlation between name-brand and private-label
share directly. We then consider various alternative reduced-form tests of this relationship. Finally,
we discuss the correlation between private-label share and prices for all goods and private-label
products.
Brand-name prices.
We inspected the histogram for each brand price in each category. Generally, these distributions
look lognormal, with a single peak and a long right tail. Thus, we summarize these distributions
by the first two moments of the log price.7
We start by examining the effect of private-label penetration on the pricing behavior of individual
name-brand firms. Table 1 shows the results of the regressions of the log (real) price of each of the
eight largest firms and the log average price of the other branded firms in each category on the log
of the share of private-label goods and three seasonal (quarterly) dummies (adjusted for first-order
autocorrelation). One reason that we control for seasonality in these regressions is MacDonald’s
finding that food prices tend to fall in periods in which demand peaks.
We have a remarkable result: When the share of private-label goods rises, the prices of name-
brand goods tend to rise (even after controlling for the possible endogeneity of the private-label
share). Despite the large number (288) of estimated coefficients, every statistically significant
coefficient (0.05 criterion) is positive.
A similar phenomenon has been observed in the pharmaceutical market (Caves, Whinston, and
Hurwitz; Grabowski and Vernon; Frank and Salkever, 1992, 1997). When generic pharmaceutical
manufacturers are allowed to sell an exact clone of a previously proprietary drug, they sell at a price
7Because we determined no clear patterns to the second moment in our regression analyses, we only briefly mention
the results here. As the share of private-label goods rises, the variance of the price of branded goods does not change
statistically significantly in fourteen categories, falls in six categories, and rises in twelve categories.
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Table 1: Elasticity of Name-Brand Firm’s Price with Respect to Private-Label Share
Eight Largest Brand Firms and Other Brand Firms
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9+
Baked beans 0.22b 0.42b 0.54b 0.28b 0.25b 0.19b 0.09 0.10b 0.31b
Butter 0.29 0.53 −0.82 0.38 −0.13 −0.84 1.15 −0.41 −0.28
Canned ham −0.03 −0.07 −0.04 0.02 −0.01 0.02b −0.02 0.00 0.04
Canned juices 0.09b 0.17b 0.37b 0.37b 0.02 −0.57 0.07 −.18 −0.05
Cottage cheese −0.14 −0.28 −0.53 −0.09 0.47a −0.11 −0.13 0.03 0.45b
Crackers 0.19b 0.26b −0.34 −0.17 0.04 −0.03 0.14a 0.03 −0.08
Desserts 0.07b 0.09b 0.03 −0.03 0.05 0.09a 0.04 0.01 0.03
English muffins −0.59 −0.10 0.14 −0.03 −0.24 −0.55 −0.01 −0.55 0.55b
Frosting 0.19b 0.10b 0.04 0.05 −0.13 0.01 0.47a −0.01 −0.08
Frozen baked goods 0.17b 0.00 0.49b 0.17b −0.05 0.32b 0.23b 0.28 −0.11
Frozen breakfast food 0.05b 0.06b 0.08b 0.26b 0.00 0.07 0.12b 0.08b −0.03
Frozen fruit 0.23 0.07 0.10 0.83b 0.66b −0.12 0.18 0.57b 0.83b
Frozen poultry −0.12 0.03 −0.07 0.14 0.10 0.18 0.12 0.05 0.25a
Gelatin mixes −0.16 −0.22 0.13b 0.11 0.20 −0.01 0.17a −0.10 0.63b
Hot cereal 0.19b −0.13 0.06b −0.14 0.05a −0.01 −0.04 0.17a −0.06
Ice cream 0.09 0.46b 0.57a 0.10 −0.13 −0.43 0.25 0.52b 0.23b
Instant potatoes 0.13 0.01 0.02 −0.15 −0.02 0.02 0.11 0.21a −0.02
Mustard and ketchup 0.31b 0.22b 0.17b 0.20b 0.06b 0.28b −0.02 0.06 0.29b
Peanut butter −0.01 0.29a 0.21a 0.01 0.24a 0.17 −0.10 −0.02 0.64b
Pickles and relish 0.09b 0.08 0.09b 0.05 0.06b 0.02 0.07b 0.12b 0.09b
Pizza products 0.05b 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.15b 0.06b 0.09b 0.05
Pizza, refrigerated 0.02 −0.02 −0.01 −0.16 −0.19 0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03
Popcorn/popcorn oil 0.25b 0.01 0.07a 0.02 0.13 −0.07 −0.09 0.00 0.14
Rice/popcorn cakes 0.20b −0.02 0.07 0.01 −0.95 −0.02 −0.01 0.04a −0.18
Shortening and oil 0.51b 0.02 −0.08 0.17 −0.54 0.08 −0.17 0.03 0.19
Snack/granola bars 0.02 0.16b −0.01 0.01 0.12b 0.09b 0.13b 0.15 0.06
Spaghetti/Italian sauce 0.11a 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.30 0.08
Sugar substitutes 0.04b −0.02 0.07a 0.33a 0.12b 0.38b 0.05a 0.03a 0.12a
Tea, ready to drink 0.21b 0.20b 0.45b 0.02 0.27b 0.19 0.15 0.00 0.18
Tomato products 0.18 0.55 0.08 0.21 0.10b 0.23 0.50b 0.09 0.06
Vinegar −0.24 −0.06 0.17 0.06 −0.83 0.08 0.42b −0.04 −0.06
Yogurt 0.37b 0.15b −0.01 0.25a 0.11 −0.07 0.38 0.04 0.00
aReject at the 0.10 confidence level the hypothesis that the elasticity (coefficient) is zero.
bReject at the 0.05 confidence level the hypothesis that the elasticity (coefficient) is zero.
Notes: Not reported are three quarterly dummies and a constant. First-order autocorrelation correction imposed.
far below the original name-brand product price. Although price-sensitive consumers switch to the
generics, the brand-conscious consumers who continue to buy the name-brand drug are frequently
charged a higher price than they paid originally. For example, Frank and Salkever (1997) reported
that the share of prescriptions sold by retail pharmacies that was accounted for by generic products
roughly doubled during the 1980s. Using a sample of thirty-two drugs that lost patent protection
during the early to mid 1980s, they found that many name-brand prices increased after generic
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entry and were accompanied by large decreases in the price of generic drugs.
Sensitivity experiments.
Are the regressions in Table 1 reasonable? Three obvious concerns are that our equations omit
other relevant factors, that the rise in the average brand-name price variable reflects a change in
composition, and that the share of private-label goods may be an endogenous variable.
We experimented with augmenting our basic regression in Table 1 (the log of brand-name price
regressed on the log of private-label share and seasonal dummies) with various combinations of the
following groups of (log) measures of diversity and market power: (A) Gini indexes for items and for
firms,8 (B) number of name-brand firms, (C) number of brands, (D) number of items,9 (E) fraction
of births and deaths, (F) shares of the two largest, four largest, and eight largest name-brand
firms, and the share of the name-brand firms other than the eight largest ones. We added each of
these groups of “structure-conduct-performance” (SCP) variables separately to the equation used
in Table 1. We also experimented with adding several groups of these variables at the same time.
None of these SCP variables substantially changed our qualitative results for the coefficient on the
private-label share. These extra variables were rarely statistically significant and their coefficients
followed no obvious pattern.10
Similarly, one might be concerned that mergers by grocery store chains played an important
role. Because our time period is relatively brief, there was relatively little change in concentration
at the national level (unlike at the regional level). We proxied for these changes by adding a time
trend, which was not statistically significant and had negligible effects on the private-label share
coefficient. Moreover, changes in grocery store market power are unlikely to differentially affect
prices within categories of food and beverages.
We were concerned that we lacked good proxies for costs. By excluding such variables, we
implicitly assumed that there were no dramatic shifts in costs during our two and onethird year
sample period. It is also possible that there were shifts in demand for reasons having nothing to do
with private labels. As a partial adjustment for unobserved shifts in costs and demand, we included
a time trend. Again this trend was not statistically significant and had negligible qualitative effects.
We examined whether our main price result is due to a change in the composition of items sold
by brand as private-label share increases. Suppose that prices did not change but that private-label
products are disproportionately large and that larger sizes have lower prices per ounce. Then, the
introduction of private labels will result in higher average brand prices.
We examined the quantity weighted average size of branded items to determine whether they
rose or fell over our sample period. We found that weighted average item sizes increased for sixteen
categories and fell for sixteen. For those sixteen categories with significantly positive branded
price responses (Table 2), the weighted average size rose for ten and fell for six categories. For
those seven categories with extremely strong positive price responses (a significant branded price
elasticity of greater than 0.2), the weighted average item sizes increases for six and fell for one.
Moreover, the sizes are comparable between branded and private-label firms; private-label firms do
8The Gini coefficient was calculated as G =
∑n
j=1
sj
n
[(n − rj) − (rj − 1)] where sj is the share of the jth item,
rj is its rank (the largest share has rank 1), and there are n items.
9We also tried regressing brand-name prices on the SCP variables and seasonal dummies (that is, dropping the
private-label share). Again, the SCP variables were rarely statistically significant and had no obvious pattern.
10One might be concerned that an increase in private-label share induces brand-name firms to reduce the number
of items they sell (thereby resulting in higher prices). However, the evidence generally rejects this hypothesis, as we
show in the following section on product diversity.
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Table 2: Elasticities of Price with Respect to the Share of Private-Label Goods
Private
All Branded Label
Baked beans −0.03 0.04 −0.36b
Butter −0.25 0.16 −0.47
Canned ham −0.10b −0.08a −0.39b
Canned juices 0.02 0.13b −0.14b
Cottage cheese −0.46b −0.02 −0.84b
Crackers −0.27b −0.12b −0.27b
Desserts 0.06a 0.06a −0.04
English muffins −0.54b −0.10 −0.67b
Frosting 0.09b 0.11b −0.02
Frozen baked goods 0.11 0.22b −0.10
Frozen breakfast food −0.02a −0.01 0.11b
Frozen fruit 0.48b 0.24 0.21
Frozen poultry 0.34b 0.35b −0.02
Gelatin mixes 0.26 0.30a −0.06
Hot cereal −0.08b 0.07a 0.01
Ice cream −0.02 0.18b 0.06
Private
All Branded Label
Instant potatoes −0.09b −0.05 0.00
Mustard & ketchup 0.15b 0.30b −0.01
Peanut butter −0.08 0.01 −0.15a
Pickles & relish 0.05b 0.06b −0.11a
Pizza products −0.06b −0.04b −0.19b
Pizza, refrigerated 0.00 −0.02 0.21
Popcorn & popcorn oil −0.43b −0.13b −0.09
Rice & popcorn cakes 0.02 0.09a −0.15b
Shortening & oil 0.12a 0.31b −0.07a
Snack/granola bars 0.00 0.01 0.04b
Spaghetti/Italian sauce 0.11b 0.14b −0.15b
Sugar substitutes −0.35b −0.06b −0.74b
Tea, ready to drink 0.30b 0.32b 0.07
Tomato products 0.1 0.43b −0.20b
Vinegar −0.63b 0.31 −0.30a
Yogurt 0.07 0.19b −0.05
aReject at the 0.10 confidence level the hypothesis that the elasticity (coefficient) is zero.
bReject at the 0.05 confidence level the hypothesis that the elasticity (coefficient) is zero.
Notes: Not reported are three quarterly dummies and a constant. First-order autocorrelation correction imposed.
not disproportionately produce only large sizes. Thus, we conclude that the hypothesis that the
entry of private labels leads to greater sales of branded items that are smaller is false, particularly
for those categories of most interest.
Finally, we considered the possibility that the share of private-label goods is endogenous. That
is, we need to consider alternative explanations for why private-label share and brand-name prices
are positively correlated. We have presented economic theories that are consistent with the possible
explanation that larger private-label share leads to higher brand-name prices. Alternatively, higher
prices of branded goods could increase the demand for private labels. To disentangle these two
stories we use instruments to control the possible simultaneity of the private-label share variable in
our price equation.11
Various factors may affect the private-label share. First, over time, consumers, having tried
private-label products, become convinced that their quality rivals that of name-brand products, so
the consumers increasingly buy these products (cf. the “try it you’ll like it” model of Kohn and
Shavell). Second, both the price of name-brand goods and the likelihood of entry of private-label
goods depend on the existence of unfilled niches in product space. Third, firms may introduce
new private-label items when the price of name-brand goods is unusually high. Fourth, consumers
may increasingly buy private-label products if branded prices rise (substitution effect). If the
increase in the share of private-label goods is due to only factors that are exogenous or at least
11As an alternative to treating private-label share as endogenous, we tried regressing price on a one period or
two-period lag of the private-label share—so that share was “predetermined.” The results were virtually the same
as when we used current share. We also experimented with a Granger-type model with short lags of both prices and
shares, which was not informative (we have too short a period for such a temporal ordering test to make sense).
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predetermined, then we are justified in treating the share of private-label goods as exogenous in our
price regressions. However, to be sure, we conduct Hausman tests of endogeneity of private-label
share using instruments.
To derive instruments, we hypothesized that the same factors causing the private-label share to
grow in one food category affect other food categories. Thus, we used the growth of the share of
private-label goods in other markets as instruments in each given market. We divided the thirty-two
industries into seven groups: canned goods, frozen goods, sweets, condiments, dairy, Italian, and
other.12 We took the average of the share of private-label goods in each of these groups and used
these as instruments (dropping the one to which the given industry belongs). Thus, each equation
had six instruments.
We then regressed the log price of branded goods in each category on the share of private-
label goods and three seasonal dummies with and without using instruments. The instrumental
variables estimates were very close to the original estimates. For example at the category level, we
rejected exogeneity at the 0.05 level on the basis of a Hausman test in only two of the thirty-two
industries (frozen poultry and rice and popcorn cakes), and even in those industries the efficient
and consistent point estimates were very close. Consequently, we report only our generalized least
squares estimates.
Relative prices.
We have demonstrated that name-brand prices rise in response to private-label entry. We now ask,
do private-label prices and overall market prices rise or fall with increased private-label penetration?
If private-label goods usually sell for less than do branded goods, the overall average price in
the market place should lie between that of private-label and name-brand goods and should fall
with entry of private-label goods. The private-label price is less than the price for branded goods
in all categories except frozen poultry, where the private-label prices are substantially higher than
those of name-brand goods. (Frozen poultry private-label goods have the largest share — nearly
two-thirds of industry quantity — of any category.)
In Table 2, we investigate the effects of private-label entry on overall, branded, and private-label
prices. Table 2 reports the entry elasticities from the regressions of the logs of average overall price,
the average branded prices, and the average private-label price on the same right-hand side variables
as in Table 1: private-label share and three quarterly dummies (where we control for first-order
autocorrelation). We considered three possible theories about the effects of increased penetration
on private-label prices:
1. If the private-label goods are essentially identical generic goods that are priced competitively
at constant marginal cost, entry of additional private-label goods should have no effect on
their price.
2. If the private-label items are monopolistically competitive as described by a Chamberlinian
model, where all goods compete with each other symmetrically (that is, not asymmetrically
as they would in a spatial model), entry is likely to lower the average price.
12The categories in our groups are canned : canned ham, canned juices; dairy: butter, cottage cheese, yogurt; frozen:
frozen breakfast food, frozen fruit, frozen poultry, and frozen baked goods; Italian: pizza products, refrigerated pizza,
spaghetti/Italian sauces; sweets: desserts, frosting, gelatin mixes, ice cream, snack/granola bars, sugar substitutes;
condiments: mustard and ketchup, pickles and relish, vinegar; other : baked beans, crackers, English muffins, hot
cereal, instant potatoes, peanut butter, shortening and oil, popcorn and popcorn oil, ready-to-drink tea, rice and
popcorn cakes, tomato products.
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3. If the private-label goods are effectively branded (e.g., Safeway’s well-regarded Select brand)
and spatially differentiated from other branded goods, entry could raise or lower price.
We expected that either the first or second stories apply in these food industries, so we expect
private-label prices to stay constant or fall with entry. The empirical evidence is consistent with
these predictions. In virtually every category, private-label penetration has no statistically signifi-
cant effect or a negative effect on the price of private-label goods. The only exceptions are frozen
breakfast foods and snack and granola bars.
From Table 1, we already know that penetration has either no statistically significant effect or
raises the price of individual branded goods.13 Although conventional industry wisdom predicts
that the overall average price will fall with increased private-label penetration, the question remains
whether it does so given the increase in name-brand prices. The overall price has a statistically
significant negative elasticity in ten categories (31%), a positive effect in six categories (19%), and is
unchanged in the remaining ones. In all but one industry where the overall elasticity is positive, the
name-brand elasticity is an even larger positive number. We conclude that an increase in private-
label share is correlated with either no effect or a decrease in the price of private-label goods, no
effect or an increase in the price of branded goods, and usually (but not always) no effect or a
negative effect on the overall price.
Promotional Activities
According to our stylized “facts”, name-brand firms engage in sales—price reductions— or nonprice
promotions in response to the private-label invasion. Unfortunately, we do not have information
about these firms’ national advertising, but we do know about local and in-store promotions—which
are increasingly the dominant forms of promotion.
Name-brand firms frequently engage in promotional activities. In a typical month, the share of
name-brand items with temporary price reductions ranges from 5% in hot cereal to 18% in butter.
The nonprice promotional activities include local feature ads and in-store displays. The lowest
share of items with nonprice promotions of merchandising is 4% for sugar substitutes and vinegar,
but the share exceeds a third for canned ham, crackers, ice cream, and readyto-drink tea. The
share of all merchandising— price and nonprice promotions combined— reaches nearly a half for
canned ham and ice cream.
There is a pronounced downward trend in promotional activities. Except for refrigerated pizza
and rice and popcorn cakes, the quantity share of items with price promotions is stable or declining.
There is little change in the share of nonprice promotions, with statistically significant decreases in
only four categories and increases in only four categories.
We regressed the share of items on sale on the share of private-label goods and the seasonal
dummies. Table 3 shows the elasticity of the share of price reductions and nonprice promotions
with respect to the private-label share. Every statistically significant elasticity of price reductions
with respect to private-label share is negative: Name-brand firms either make no change or have
fewer sales. As private labels expand, name-brand firms are substantially less likely to engage in
nonprice promotions using feature ads and displays. Not only are virtually all the statistically
significant elasticities negative (the pizza product category is the only exception), but most of
13However in Table 2, the elasticity for several of the aggregated name-branded categories is statistically signif-
icantly negative. Presumably this inconsistent result reflects the aggregation of several negative (but statistically
insignificant) elasticities for the individual firms in Table 1.
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Table 3: Elasticity of the Share of Promotions with Respect to the Private-Label Share
Price Nonprice
Reductions Promotions
Baked beans −0.89b −3.33b
Butter 4.17a −10.94b
Canned ham 0.14 0.19
Canned juices −0.58 −0.84b
Cottage cheese −0.45 1.73
Crackers −0.17 −0.48b
Desserts −0.49a −0.32
English muffins 0.78 −1.51b
Frosting −2.17b −2.93b
Frozen baked goods −0.82b −1.70b
Frozen breakfast food −0.25b −0.02
Frozen fruit −1.13 −0.97
Frozen poultry −0.11 −0.21a
Gelatin mixes −0.29 −1.70b
Hot cereal −1.87b −4.90b
Ice cream −1.09b −1.17b
Price Nonprice
Reductions Promotions
Instant potatoes −0.99a −3.89b
Mustard & ketchup 0.22 −4.48b
Peanut butter −0.14 −3.10b
Pickles & relish −0.78b −0.53b
Pizza products −0.08 0.76b
Pizza, refrigerated −1.02b −0.03
Popcorn & popcorn oil −1.66b −3.92b
Rice & popcorn cakes −1.32a −4.08b
Shortening & oil −0.27 −2.09b
Snack/granola bars −0.17 −3.02
Spaghetti/Italian sauce −0.38a −0.96b
Sugar substitutes −0.40 −2.29b
Tea, ready to drink −0.37b −0.45b
Tomato products −0.86a −1.15
Vinegar −0.12 0.00
Yogurt −2.90b −4.05b
aReject at the 0.10 confidence level the hypothesis that the elasticity (coefficient) is zero.
bReject at the 0.05 confidence level the hypothesis that the elasticity (coefficient) is zero.
Notes: Not reported are three quarterly dummies and a constant. First-order autocorrelation correction imposed.
these negative elasticities are larger than one in absolute value—in many cases much larger. For
example, the elasticities for rice and popcorn cakes, yogurt, mustard and ketchup, and hot cereals
are between -4 and -5, while the elasticity for butter is nearly -11. The statistically significant sales
elasticities are also negative, though usually smaller in absolute value than the nonprice promotion
elasticities. Thus, our findings once again repudiate the conventional wisdom: Name-brand firms
react to increased private-label competition by holding fewer sales and reducing the share of items
with nonprice promotions.
Differentiation
As we lack information about the detailed characteristics and qualities of the gigantic number of
items produced, we cannot directly look at the degree of differentiation. Instead, we use the number
of items, the number of births and deaths of items, and the ratio of items to firms as proxies for
the attempts by name-brand firms to differentiate their products.
What has happened to the number of name-brand items and firms? Have the private-label goods
driven some name-brand firms and items out of business? Or, have name-brand firms—attempting
to further differentiate their products—increased the number of items they sell?
The number of firms, brands, and items varies substantially across industries. In a typical
month, the canned ham industry had an average of thirty firms, fourty-one brands, and eighty-six
items, whereas the ice cream industry had more than eleven times as many firms (342), more than
fifteen times as many brands (626), and nearly eighty-five times as many items (7,294).
Unlike at the beginning of the 1990s, the number of branded items and firms is falling in the
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Table 4: Elasticities of Number of Name-Brand Items, Number of Firms, and Items per Firm with
Respect to the Private-Label Share
Number Number Items
of of per
Items Firms Firm
Baked beans −0.07a −0.02 −0.03
Butter −0.19b −0.12 −0.06
Canned ham 0.00 0.02 −0.01
Canned juices −0.09 0.02 −0.23b
Cottage cheese −0.22b −0.28b 0.08
Crackers −0.03 0.02 −0.05
Desserts 0.02 −0.01 0.00
English muffins 0.14 0.19 −0.08
Frosting −0.06 0.00 −0.07
Frozen baked goods −0.04 −0.01 −0.06
Frozen breakfast food 0.12b 0.12b 0.02
Frozen fruit −0.27 −0.41 0.25
Frozen poultry 0.03a 0.14b −0.13b
Gelatin mixes 0.02 −0.01 −0.03
Hot cereal −0.06a 0.04 −0.11b
Ice cream −0.01 0.07 −0.16b
Number Number Items
of of per
Items Firms Firm
Instant potatoes −0.01 −0.08 0.08
Mustard & ketchup 0.03 0.05a −0.02
Peanut butter 0.09 0.14 −0.05
Pickles & relish −0.01 0.00 −0.03a
Pizza products 0.03 0.04 −0.01
Pizza, refrigerated 0.10 0.15b 0.03
Popcorn & popcorn oil 0.10 0.27a −0.10
Rice & popcorn cakes −0.03 0.15b −0.19b
Shortening & oil −0.02 0.07 −0.10
Snack/granola bars 0.07 0.11b 0.12b
Spaghetti/Italian sauce 0.02 0.03 −0.03
Sugar substitutes −0.27b −0.18b −0.10b
Tea, ready to drink −0.13a −0.06 0.03
Tomato products 0.00 −0.02 0.06
Vinegar −0.17 −0.32b −0.02
Yogurt −0.02 −0.08 0.02
aReject at the 0.10 confidence level the hypothesis that the elasticity (coefficient) is zero.
bReject at the 0.05 confidence level the hypothesis that the elasticity (coefficient) is zero.
Notes: Not reported are three quarterly dummies and a constant. First-order autocorrelation correction imposed.
majority of categories. Although the number of items and firms is more likely to be increasing in
categories where total quantity is growing, the relationship between quantity growth and growth
in the number of items or firms is not a strong one. Counterexamples include ready-to-drink tea
products, where quantity grew at 13.2% per year, yet the number of branded firms selling these
products fell by 8.3% per year and the number of branded items dropped at a 7.9% annual rate.
Does the number of items per firm fall as private-label penetration increases? To answer this
question, we regressed the log of the ratio of items to firms on private-label share and three seasonal
dummies, correcting for first-order autocorrelation. Table 4 shows that differentiation—as measured
by items per firm—does not increase with private-label competition, contrary to our stylized “fact”.
There is a statistically significant elasticity of the items per firm with respect to private-label share
in only seven categories. Of these, only one elasticity is positive. Of course, it is still possible that
name-brand firms increasingly modify their products’ characteristics or raise the quality of existing
products.
Another indicator of differentiation by firms is the rate at which they create new products (and
kill off old ones). The average number of births and deaths per firm are roughly equal in most
categories, which is consistent with relatively small rates of increase or decrease in the number of
items per firm over time. Additionally, this observation is consistent with the flagpole theory in
which firms are constantly creating new items and removing old items to try to stay abreast of
changing consumer tastes.
The quantity share of new and deceased products out of all branded items is relatively small.
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(The share of births is from the current period and the share of deceased goods is from the previous
period.) One might expect that firms would choose to eliminate unsuccessful products with small
shares. Given that there are roughly an equal number of births and deaths, one might infer that
the collective share of births would be larger than that of deceased goods. In only a few sectors is
the share of births is substantially larger than that of cancelled products. For example, the share
of new canned ham items and new frozen poultry items are roughly twice that of deceased items.
In most sectors, the shares of the births and the deaths are roughly equal.
We might also expect that the prices of both new and eliminated items would be lower than
the prices of other items. New products might have low introductory prices. Before eliminating
an unsuccessful product, a firm might try lowering its price. However, the prices of both new and
eliminated items are roughly equal and are usually fairly close to the prices of other goods (the
price ratios in the table are roughly equal to one). One notable exception is popcorn and popcorn
oil where the prices of new and eliminated items are only about two-thirds that of continuing
items. Another interesting exception is mustard and ketchup where new (more specialized?) items
typically cost twice as much as do existing products, and even eliminated items are 50% more
expensive than continuing items.
Summary and Conclusions
Using statements by industry experts, we collected a set of stylized facts about the invasion of
private-label products into supermarkets. We then used supermarket scanner data to examine the
validity of these beliefs.
The first belief is that private-label products continue to expand their share of food industries.
This view is correct in only some food categories. We find that the quantity share of private-label
(and generic) goods is increasing in less than half of food and beverages categories, but this share
is growing at double-digit annual rates for one in four categories.
The second set of beliefs concerns the response of name-brand firms to the increased competition
from the private labels. The conventional industry wisdom is that name-brand firms defended their
brands against the private-label invasion by lowering their prices, engaging in additional promotional
activities, and increasingly differentiating their products. Our empirical evidence is inconsistent
with these beliefs.
Increases in the share of private-label goods are correlated with a rise in the price of name-
brand goods. Because an increase in private-label share has no effect on or decreases the price of
private-label goods, the overall price level usually (but not always) remains unchanged or falls. As
the share of sales to private-label products rise, name-brand firms hold fewer sales and decrease the
share of items with nonprice promotions. When the private-label share increases, the number of
name-brand items per firm—a measure of differentiation—is unchanged or falls.
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